Teaming Agreement Exclusivity
Sometimes (when there is no exclusive team agreement), we even present proposals as bonuses and subcontractors. This is a good point and I had thought about it, but in many cases, the proposed principal contractor has already entered into other contracts, often with the same proposed subcontractor that offers the same type of products/services from delivery contracts. This “FAR” clause would therefore be in effect under these other treaties. Wouldn‘t that prevent the priority of reaching a team agreement with the subcommittee on a new SSP for similar work? It makes no sense for cooperation to be so limited because, as Vern pointed out, it is recognised as acceptable after paragraph 9.6 of the FAR, but the language of this clause amazes me. Is there only one project to prohibit contractors from preventing subcontractors from engaging as the main contractor for competition in this specific contract? Or are team agreements an exception to 52.203–6 (b)? There seems to be a general consensus that it doesn‘t matter, but my OCD lets me know why it‘s right. The equipment agreement therefore links the sub-premium to competition-related purposes, in which the subcontractor has not been able to compete independently and not offer its products independently. I don‘t see any conflict with the 52.203–6. In addition to the explanation of the second remark, we do not insert ourselves or make double proposals. In summary, the exclusive team agreement, where two companies unite exclusively to pursue a DoD contract and one of these companies is the sole provider of an essential service, is likely to be challenged by contract agents. In fact, there have already been DoD purchase contracts, where exclusive team agreements have been totally banned.
While the proposed FTC/DOJ guidelines are not limited to cooperation between competitors in the area of public procurement at the federal level, they provide a framework for analyzing the impact of specific cooperation on competition to determine whether the government risks challenging them. Contractors and government officials should familiarize themselves with these documents and remain vigilant for the publication of the proposed DFARS amendment and the proposed FTC/DOJ guidelines. While the courts have generally concluded that the “pre-price” clauses contained in merger contracts, such as exclusivity and confidentiality, are enforceable, what if the parties fail to agree on the terms of subcontracting? Risk analysis involves agreements that harm competition and have no competitive advantage that they do not warrant further study of their likely effects. Instead, these collaborations are in themselves illegally called into question. These cooperations include “agreements” that tend to raise prices or reduce production. For example, pricing, supply manipulation, production fixing and market allocation or distribution agreements in (a) customers, (b) suppliers, © territories or (d) commercial lines. The management strategy of a well-established company is, in most cases, the obligation to require the exclusivity of its subs. Exceptions are companies that offer specialized products or services that no one else has. The other exceptions are companies with skills and experience strong enough to be able to collude on a non-exclusive TA. It may be foolish to let them slip without being signed because they refuse to be exclusive. This is an area in which companies sometimes do not balance. Someone at the top can decide that their business is King of the Hill and that all subs will be exclusive.
Maybe it‘s a nightmare for the comic book director.